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1 Introduction
Non-classical logics aim to formalize reasoning in a wide
variety of different contexts in which the classical ap-
proach might be inadequate or not sufficiently flexible.
This is typically the case when the information to rea-
son about is not perfect, e.g. because it is incomplete,
imprecise or contradictory.
On the one hand, fuzzy logics have been proposed
as a powerful tool for reasoning with imprecise infor-
mation, in particular for reasoning with propositions
containing vague predicates. Their main feature is that
they allow to interpret formulas in a linearly ordered
scale of truth values which makes them specially suited
for representing the gradual aspects of vagueness. Orig-
inating from fuzzy set theory [47] they have given rise
to the deeply developed area of mathematical fuzzy
logic [12] (MFL). Particular deductive systems in MFL
have been usually studied under the paradigm of truth-
preservation which, generalizing the classical notion of
consequence, postulates that a formula follows from a
set of premises if every algebraic evaluation that in-
terprets the premises as true also interprets the con-
clusion as true. Despite of the fact that the semantics
is given by algebras with many truth values (or truth
degrees), the only values relevant as regards to conse-
quence (those that have to be preserved) are only those
in a designated set of values in the algebras (often just
one designated value), which are regarded as the full or
complete truth-degrees. In other words, the defining re-
quirement in the truth-preservation paradigm for an in-
ference to be valid is, actually, that every algebraic eval-
uation that interprets the premises as completely true,
will also interpret the conclusion as completely true. An
alternative approach that has recently received some
attention is based on the degree-preservation paradigm
(see [25,6]), in which a conclusion follows from a set of
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premises if, for all evaluations, the truth degree of the
conclusion is not lower than that of the premises. It has
been argued that this approach is more coherent with
the commitment of many-valued logics to truth-degree
semantics because all values play an equally important
roˆle in the corresponding notion of consequence (see
e.g. [26]).
On the other hand, paraconsistent logics have been
introduced, among other approaches (see e.g. [5]), as
deductive systems able to cope with contradictions. As
much as vagueness, inconsistency is ubiquitious in many
contexts in which, regardless of the information being
contradictory, one is still expected to extract inferences
“in a sensible way”. Classical logic, and in general any
logic validating the ex contradictione quodlibet princi-
ple (ECQ), does not allow to reason in any interesting
way in the presence of contradictions, since they trivi-
alize deduction allowing to extract any conclusion from
an inconsistent theory. They are explosive, in this sense.
In contrast, paraconsistent logics are deductive systems
where ECQ does not hold, so they allow to tackle con-
tradictions without trivializing the logic. This kind of
systems can be found, for example, in the realm of rel-
evant logics, whose paraconsistent features are not cen-
tral, but a by-product of the general principle that one
should not infer conclusions which do not bear a “rel-
evant connection” with their premises. Besides those,
there have been many studies purposefully focused on
paraconsistency giving rise to a variety of logical sys-
tems: non-adjunctive systems like Ja´skowski’s discus-
sive logic, non-truth-functional logics like da Costa’s C1
and Cω, adaptive logics, Priest’s logic of paradox and
similar many-valued paraconsistent systems, logics with
relational valuations, paraconsistent logics with an al-
gebraic semantics, etc. (see e.g. [42] for a, slightly dated,
survey on these systems, and [35] for a more recent one).
Yet another approach to paraconsistency that, stem-
ming from da Costa’s approach [16,9], has recently at-
tracted interest is that of logics of formal inconsistency
(LFIs), mainly studied by the Brazilian school [8] but
also by other scholars [3,2]. The main merit of LFIs
is that they are paraconsistent logics that manage to
internalize the notions of consistency and inconsistency
at the object-language level.1
Obviously, those phenomena of imperfect informa-
tion are not mutually independent, but very often found
together in many particular examples. Therefore, one
might wish for logical systems to be able to cope with
several of them at once. In particular, it would be de-
sirable to have logics for vague and inconsistent infor-
1 Notice here that in the frame of LFIs the term consis-
tent refers to formulas that basically exhibit a classical logic
behaviour, so in particular an explosive behaviour.
mation. In this paper we take the first steps towards an
approach to this problem in the context of MFL which,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been considered
yet. We want to study paraconsistent fuzzy logics, hop-
ing to have the best of both worlds, i.e. a good tool
for reasoning with gradual predicates in possibly con-
tradictory theories. We will argue that the appropriate
paradigm for that is not the usual truth-preserving ap-
proach, but the degree-preserving one, setting the stage
for future development.
After this introduction, Section 2 briefly introduces
the necessary basic notions on both paraconsistent and
fuzzy logics. Then Section 3 shows that truth-preserving
fuzzy logics are explosive, while under some conditions
degree-preserving logics are not, and hence they can be
seen as paraconsistent systems; we explore their para-
consistency features, give particular examples to illus-
trate them and characterize a family of LFIs inside
fuzzy logics. Since paraconsistency is always defined
with respect to a particular negation connective (re-
sponsible for the contradictions in inconsistent theo-
ries), Section 4 explores alternative negations in fuzzy
logics and their interplay with paraconsistency. Sec-
tion 5 studies first-order predicate degree-preserving
fuzzy logics and their paraconsistency properties. Fi-
nally, in Section 6 we add some concluding remarks in
which we briefly compare our proposed paraconsistent
fuzzy logics with other paraconsistent logics.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the necessary notation and
results that will support our investigation. In particu-
lar, we briefly present the basic notions on paraconsis-
tent logics (focusing on logics of formal inconsistency)
and fuzzy logics (focusing on degree-preserving fuzzy
logics) that will be used in the paper. We invite the
reader to consult [8] and [6] respectively, for more ex-
haustive treatments of both kinds of logics.
2.1 About paraconsistency and logics of formal
inconsistency
As already mentioned above, paraconsistent logics are
systems that allow to deal with contradictions without
trivializing the logic. In what follows we will always
assume each logic to be finitary, monotonic and to have
at least one negation connective that we will denote, as
usual, by ¬.2
2 In a very general setting, one could argue what proper-
ties should be required for a unary connective to be properly
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Definition 1 A logic L is explosive (with respect to ¬)
if α,¬α `L β, for every formula α and β. L is paracon-
sistent (with respect to ¬) if it is not explosive (with
respect to ¬).
Whenever clear from the context, we will omit to write
with respect to which negation a given logic is explo-
sive or paraconsistent. Following [8], paraconsistent log-
ics can be further classified according to several fea-
tures they exhibit. We provide here the main defini-
tions from [8] (remember we assume the logic L to be
monotonic).
Definition 2 Let L be a logic and let σ(p0, . . . , pn) be
a formula. The logic L is said to be:
1. partially explosive with respect to σ (or σ-partially
explosive), provided that
(a) there are formulas ψ0, . . . , ψn such that
6`L σ(ψ0, . . . , ψn), and
(b) for all formulas ψ0, . . . , ψn, ϕ, it holds
ϕ,¬ϕ `L σ(ψ0, . . . , ψn).
2. boldly paraconsistent if there is no σ such that L is
σ-partially explosive,
3. controllably explosive in contact with σ, if
(a) there are formulas α, α0, . . . , αn, β such that
σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L α,
¬σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L β,
and
(b) for all formulas ψ0, . . . , ψn, ϕ, it holds
σ(ψ0, . . . , ψn),¬σ(ψ0, . . . , ψn) `L ϕ.
Johansson’s minimal logic [34], where from a contra-
diction every negation follows, is an example of a logic
that is paraconsistent but not boldly paraconsistent,
since from a contradiction every negation follows. In
Section 3 we will provide both examples of paraconsis-
tent fuzzy logics (related to finitely-valued  Lukasiewicz
logics) that are controllably explosive and examples (re-
lated to the infinitely-valued  Lukasiewicz logic) that are
not controllably explosive.
As a notation, let us write ©(p) to denote a (possi-
bly empty) set of formulas which only depends on the
propositional variable p.
Definition 3 Let L be a logic and ©(p) a set of for-
mulas. L is gently explosive with respect to ©(p) if
(a) there are formulas ϕ and ψ such that
called a negation. However, in the context of the fuzzy logic
systems considered later in this paper, all the negation con-
nectives that we will deal with are indeed proper negations,
in the sense that their truth-tables always revert to the clas-
sical negation truth-table as soon as we restrict ourselves to
the classical 0 and 1 truth-values.
©(ϕ), ϕ 6`L ψ,
©(ϕ),¬ϕ 6`L ψ,
and
(b) for all formulas ϕ and ψ, it holds
©(ϕ), ϕ,¬ϕ `L ψ.
If furthermore©(p) is finite, we say that L is finitely
gently explosive.
Observe that if L is finitary and gently explosive,
then it is also finitely gently explosive.
Following [8], given a negation ¬, we say that a para-
consistent logic L is a Logic of Formal Inconsistency
(with respect to ¬), (¬-LFI in symbols), if there exists
a set of formulas©(p) such that L is ¬-gently explosive
w.r.t. ©(p).
2.2 About truth-preserving and degree-preserving
fuzzy logics
For the sake of not making this paper excessively long,
in the following we only introduce the main needed no-
tions of some classes of fuzzy logics, though not in full
details. However, any unexplained notion mentioned in
the paper can be found e.g. in [12].
Truth-preserving fuzzy logics. The most well known
and studied systems of mathematical fuzzy logic are
the so-called t-norm based fuzzy logics, corresponding
to formal many-valued calculi with truth-values in the
real unit interval [0, 1] and with a conjunction and an
implication interpreted respectively by a (left-) contin-
uous t-norm and its residuum. For instance, the well-
known  Lukasiewicz and Go¨del infinitely-valued logics,
correspond to the calculi defined by  Lukasiewicz and
min t-norms respectively. The weakest t-norm based
fuzzy logic is the logic MTL (monoidal t-norm based
logic) introduced in [21], whose theorems correspond
to the common tautologies of all many-valued calculi
defined by a left-continuous t-norm and its residuated
implication [33].
The language of MTL consists of denumerably many
propositional variables p1, p2, . . ., binary connectives ∧,
&, →, and the truth constant 0. Formulas, which will
be denoted by lower case greek letters ϕ,ψ, χ, . . ., are
defined by induction as usual. Further connectives and
constants are definable, in particular: ¬ϕ stands for
ϕ → 0, ϕ ∨ ψ stands for ((ϕ → ψ) → ψ) ∧ ((ψ →
ϕ)→ ϕ), and 1 stands for ¬0. A Hilbert-style calculus
for MTL was introduced in [21] with the following set
of axioms:
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(A1) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(A2) ϕ& ψ → ϕ
(A3) ϕ& ψ → ψ & ϕ
(A4) ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ
(A5) ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ
(A6) ϕ& (ϕ→ ψ)→ ϕ ∧ ψ
(A7a) (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))→ (ϕ& ψ → χ)
(A7b) (ϕ& ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))
(A8) ((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ)
(A9) 0→ ϕ
and modus ponens as its unique inference rule: from ϕ
and ϕ→ ψ derive ψ.
MTL is an algebraizable logic in the sense of Blok
and Pigozzi [7] and its equivalent algebraic semantics is
given by the class of MTL-algebras, that is indeed a va-
riety; call itMTL. MTL-algebras can be equivalently in-
troduced as commutative, bounded, integral residuated
lattices 〈A,∧A,∨A,&A,→A, 0A, 1A〉 further satisfying
the following prelinearity condition: (x→A y)∨A(y →A
x) = 1
A
for every x, y ∈ A.
Given an MTL-algebra A, an A-evaluation is any
function mapping each propositional variable into A,
e(0) = 0
A
and such that, for each formulas ϕ and ψ,
we have e(ϕ ∧ ψ) = e(ϕ) ∧A e(ψ); e(ϕ ∨ ψ) = e(ϕ) ∨A
e(ψ); e(ϕ & ψ) = e(ϕ) &A e(ψ); e(ϕ → ψ) = e(ϕ) →A
e(ψ). An evaluation e is said to be a model for a set of
formulas Γ , if e(γ) = 1
A
for each γ ∈ Γ .
We shall henceforth adopt a lighter notation drop-
ping the superscript A when no confusion is possible.
Algebraizability gives the following strong complete-
ness theorem:
For every set Γ ∪ {ϕ} of formulae, Γ `MTL ϕ iff,
for every A ∈ MTL and every A-evaluation e, if e
is a model of Γ then e is a model of ϕ as well.
For this reason, since the consequence relation amounts
to preservation of the truth-constant 1, MTL can be
called a truth-preserving logic.
In Tables 1 and 2 one can find the definitions of the
main axiomatic extensions of MTL that will be referred
to along the paper. Observe that the extension of any
of these systems with the excluded middle, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ, is
already classical logic.
Actually, the algebraizability is preserved for any
logic L that is an axiomatic expansion of MTL satisfy-
ing the following congruence property
(Cng) ϕ→ ψ,ψ → ϕ `L c(χ1, . . . , ϕ, . . . , χn)
→ c(χ1, . . . , ψ, . . . , χn)
Axiom schema Name
¬¬ϕ→ ϕ (Inv)
¬ϕ ∨ ((ϕ→ ϕ& ψ)→ ψ) (C)
ϕ→ ϕ& ϕ (Con)
ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ& (ϕ→ ψ) (Div)
ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ→ 0 (PC)
(ϕ& ψ → 0) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ& ψ) (WNM)
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ (EM)
Table 1 Some usual axiom schemata in fuzzy logics.
for any possible new n-ary connective c.3 This is due
to the fact that such axiomatic expansions, also called
core fuzzy logics, are in fact Rasiowa-implicative log-
ics (cf. [44]) and, as proved in [14], every Rasiowa-
implicative logic L is algebraizable. Moreover, if it is
finitary, then its equivalent algebraic semantics, the class
L of L-algebras, is a quasivariety (a variety in the case
of a core fuzzy logic).
Logic Additional axioms
Strict MTL (SMTL) (PC)
Involutive MTL (IMTL) (Inv)
Weak Nilpotent Minimum (WNM) (WNM)
Nilpotent Minimum (NM) (Inv) and (WNM)
Basic Logic (BL) (Div)
Strict Basic Logic (SBL) (Div) and (PC)
 Lukasiewicz Logic ( L) (Div) and (Inv)
Product Logic (Π) (Div) and (C)
Go¨del Logic (G) (Con)
Classical Logic (CL) (EM)
Table 2 Some axiomatic extensions of MTL obtained by
adding the corresponding additional axiom schemata.
As a consequence, any core fuzzy logic L enjoys the
same kind of completeness theorem with respect to the
corresponding L-algebras. However, more than that, the
variety of L-algebras can also be shown to be generated
by the subclass of all its linearly ordered members [14].4
This means that any core fuzzy logic L is strongly com-
plete with respect to the class of L-chains, that is, core
fuzzy logics are semilinear.
The logic MTL4 is the (non-axiomatic) expansion
of MTL with the Monteiro-Baaz projection connective
3 c(χ1, . . . , ϕ, . . . , χn) and c(χ1, . . . , ψ, . . . , χn) denote two
instances of the n-ary connective c where ϕ and ψ appear in a
same (arbitrary) i-th place in c (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n), while keeping
the same formulas χj ’s (with j 6= i) in the other places.
4 Moreover, for a number of core fuzzy logics, including
MTL, it has been shown that their corresponding varieties
are also generated by the subclass of MTL-chains defined
on the real unit interval, called standard algebras. For in-
stance, MTL is also complete wrt standard MTL-chains, that
are of the form [0, 1]∗ = 〈[0, 1],min,max, ∗,→∗, 1, 0〉 of type
〈2, 2, 2, 2, 0, 0〉, where ∗ denotes a left-continuous t-norm and
→∗ is its residuum [33].
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4, which turns out to be a finitary Rasiowa-implicative
semilinear logic as well. Then, one analogously defines
4-core fuzzy logics as axiomatic expansions of MTL4
satisfying (Cng) for any possible new connective.
Semilinearity is also inherited by many expansions
of (4-)core fuzzy logics with new (finitary) inference
rules. Indeed, in [14] it is shown that an expansion L
of a core fuzzy logic is semilinear iff it is closed under
∨-forms of each newly added finitary inference rule, i.e.
for each such rule
(R) from Γ derive ϕ,
its corresponding ∨-form
(R∨) from Γ ∨ p derive ϕ ∨ p
is derivable in L as well, where p is an arbitrary propo-
sitional variable not appearing in Γ ∪ {ϕ} and Γ ∨ p =
{ψ ∨ p | ψ ∈ Γ}.
Degree-preserving fuzzy logics. Clearly, core fuzzy
logics and their Rasiowa-implicative semilinear expan-
sions are truth-preserving fuzzy logics. However, be-
sides this paradigm that we have so far considered, one
can find an alternative approach in the literature. Given
a (finitary Rasiowa-implicative semilinear expansion of
a) core fuzzy logic L, and based on the definitions in [6],
we introduce a variant of L that we will denote by L≤,
whose associated deducibility relation has the following
semantics, where K is the class of L-chains:
For every set of formulas Γ ∪{ϕ}, Γ `L≤ ϕ iff there
exists a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that for every A ∈ K,
every a ∈ A, and every A-evaluation v, if a ≤ v(ψ)
for every ψ ∈ Γ0, then a ≤ v(ϕ).
For this reason L≤ is known as a fuzzy logic preserving
degrees of truth, or the degree-preserving companion of
L. As it is clear from the definition, L≤ is a finitary
logic.5 Actually it is very easy to check that if L is
complete with respect to a subclass of L-chains K′ ⊆ K,
one can safely replace K by K′ in the above definition of
`L≤ . Notice that there are many (4-)core fuzzy logics
that are indeed complete with respect to a single L-
chain.
In this paper, we will often use generic statements
about “every logic L≤” referring to “the degree-preserving
companion of any finitary Rasiowa-implicative semilin-
ear expansion of a (4-)core fuzzy logic L”.
Let L be a core fuzzy logic. We know it has a Hilbert-
style axiomatization with modus ponens as the only in-
ference rule. It is not difficult to obtain an axiomatic
system for L≤, taking the axioms of L and the following
deduction rules [6]:
5 It is worth noticing that, even if we drop in the above
definition the condition of the existence of a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ ,
the logic L≤ remains finitary [30].
(Adj-∧) from ϕ and ψ derive ϕ ∧ ψ ,
(MP-r) if `L ϕ → ψ (i.e. if ϕ → ψ is a theorem of L),
then from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ derive ψ .
Note that if the set of theorems of L is decidable, then
the above is in fact a recursive Hilbert-style axiomatiza-
tion of L≤. The notion of proof, denoted `L≤ , is defined
as usual from the above set of axioms and rules.
In general, let L be a finitary Rasiowa-implicative
semilinear expansion of MTL with a set of new inference
rules
(Ri) from Γi derive ϕi,
for i ∈ I. Then, following the same idea of the proof of
[6, Th. 2.12], we have the following generalised result.
Proposition 1 L≤ is axiomatized by adding to the ax-
ioms of L the above two inference rules plus the follow-
ing restricted rules
(Ri-r) If `L Γi, then from Γi derive ϕi
for each i ∈ I.
Proof: First of all, notice that each rule (Ri-r) is sound
with respect to the semantics of L≤. W.l.o.g. assume
Σ `L≤ ψ, where Σ = {δ1, . . . , δn} is a finite set of
formulas. By the semantics of `L≤ , this means that
`L Σ∧ → ψ, where Σ∧ =
∧{δi | i = 1, . . . , n}. In other
words, Σ∧ → ψ is a theorem of L, and hence there is
a proof Φ in L from its axioms and rules. Then we can
easily convert Φ into a proof Φ′ in L≤ of ψ from Σ. In-
deed, all we have to do is to replace every application of
an inference rule (R) from L (including modus ponens)
by its corresponding restricted form (R-r),6 followed by
n−1 applications of the rule (Adj-∧) to obtain Σ∧, and
a last application of the rule (MP-r) to Σ∧ and Σ∧ → ψ
to finally obtain ψ. a
In particular, if L is a 4-core fuzzy logic, then the
only rule one should add is the following restricted ne-
cessitation rule for 4:
(4-r) if `L ϕ, then from ϕ derive 4ϕ .
The following proposition points out some key analo-
gies and differences between L and L≤ that we will use
in the rest of this paper.
Proposition 2 [cf. [6]] The following facts hold:
(1) The two logics L and L≤ have the same theorems:
`L ϕ iff `L≤ ϕ.
(2) For all formulas ϕ,ψ one has:
(i) ϕ,ψ `L ϕ& ψ; ϕ,ψ `L ϕ ∧ ψ;
(ii) ϕ,ψ `L≤ ϕ ∧ ψ.
6 Note that applications of inference rules in Φ are only to
theorems of L.
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(3) ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `L≤ ψ iff `L (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)→ ψ.
The last item (3) interestingly points out that, indeed,
deductions in L≤ exactly correspond to theorems in L.
Moreover, it makes clear that the logic L≤ is monotone.
3 Paraconsistent fuzzy logics
The first important observation is that (4-)core fuzzy
logics as studied in the truth-preservation paradigm do
not have any paraconsistency feature regarding their
residual negation ¬.
Proposition 3 (4-)Core fuzzy logics are explosive with
respect to ¬.
Proof: It is easy to see that in these logics the following
derivations hold: ϕ,¬ϕ ` ϕ& ¬ϕ, and ϕ& ¬ϕ ` 0. a
Thus, (4-)core fuzzy logics are not paraconsistent.
In contrast, their degree-preserving companions are para-
consistent provided that they do not prove the pseudo-
complementation law (PC): (ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ)→ 0.7
Proposition 4 Let L be a (4-)core fuzzy logic. Then
L≤ is paraconsistent iff L is not an expansion of SMTL,
i.e. iff (PC) does not hold in L.
Proof: L≤ is explosive iff ϕ,¬ϕ `L≤ 0 iff (by the third
item of Proposition 2) `L ϕ∧¬ϕ→ 0 iff L is an expan-
sion of SMTL. a
Next, we study what kinds of paraconsistency prop-
erties those logics enjoy. The first obvious question is
whether they are boldly paraconsistent or partially ex-
plosive with respect to some formula.
Proposition 5 Every paraconsistent logic L≤ is par-
tially explosive with respect to σ(p) = p ∨ ¬p.
Proof: L proves Kleene’s axiom (ϕ∧¬ϕ)→ (ψ∨¬ψ) (as
it can be easily checked over chains of the corresponding
variety, which, as we know, give a complete semantics
for the logic). Therefore, we have ϕ,¬ϕ `L≤ ψ ∨ ¬ψ.
On the other hand, if L is consistent and is not classical
logic, ψ ∨ ¬ψ is not a theorem of L≤ (if L is classical
logic, then so is L≤, and thus it is explosive; if L is
inconsistent, then so is L≤ and thus also explosive). a
Therefore, the logics L≤ may be paraconsistent, but
they are never boldly paraconsistent. When it comes to
controllable explosion, we can characterize the class of
such logics which are controllably explosive in terms of
the following notion of locally Boolean logic.
7 It is worth noticing that Priest already noticed in [43]
that the degree-preserving  Lukasiewicz logic  L≤ was para-
consistent.
Definition 4 A logic L≤ is locally Boolean if there ex-
ists a formula σ such that 6`L≤ ¬σ, 6`L≤ ¬¬σ, and for
every L-chain A and every A-evaluation v, v(¬σ) ∈
{0A, 1A}.
Proposition 6 A paraconsistent logic L≤ is control-
lably explosive iff it is locally Boolean.
Proof: Assume that L≤ is controllably explosive w.r.t. a
formula σ(p0, . . . , pn). This means that there are formu-
las α, α0, . . . , αn, β such that σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L≤ α, and
¬σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L≤ β; moreover, for every γ0, . . . , γn, γ,
it holds
σ(γ0, . . . , γn),¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn) `L≤ γ.
Therefore, by completeness w.r.t. chains, the above holds
iff for every L-chain A, and every A-evaluation v,
v(σ(γ0, . . . , γn) ∧ ¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) = 0A.
Then either v(σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) = 0
A
, and hence we
have v(¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) = 1A, or v(¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) =
0
A
otherwise. Moreover, from the existence of formulas
α, α0, . . . , αn such that σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L≤ α, we infer
that there must exist an L-chain B and a B-evaluation
e such that e(σ) 6= 0B, and hence 6`L≤ ¬σ. Similarly,
from the fact that ¬σ(α0, . . . , αn) 6`L≤ β, we know that
there is an L-chain C and a C-evaluation e′ such that
e′(¬σ) 6= 0C ; therefore we have e′(σ) = 0C and thus
e′(¬¬σ) = 0C and 6`L≤ ¬¬σ. Therefore L≤ is locally
Boolean.
Now assume that L≤ is locally Boolean, i.e. there is
a formula σ such that 6`L≤ ¬σ, 6`L≤ ¬¬σ, and for every
L-chain A and every A-evaluation v, we have v(¬σ) ∈
{0A, 1A}. Let p0, . . . , pn be the variables occurring in
σ. Thus, for every substitution of p0, . . . , pn by arbi-
trary formulas γ0, . . . , γn, we have v(¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) ∈
{0A, 1A}. Thus, either it holds that v(¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) =
0
A
, or v(¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) = 1A and hence, in the lat-
ter case, v(σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) = 0
A
. Therefore, for every
γ0, . . . , γn, γ,
0
A
= v(σ(γ0, . . . , γn) ∧ ¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn)) ≤ v(γ),
that is,
σ(γ0, . . . , γn),¬σ(γ0, . . . , γn) `L≤ γ.
On the other hand, since 6`L≤ ¬σ, there is an L-chain
B and a B-evaluation e such that e(¬σ) 6= 1B and
hence e(σ) 6= 0B. Similarly, since 6`L≤ ¬¬σ, there is an
L-chain C and a C-evaluation e′ such that e(¬¬σ) 6=
1
C
and hence e(¬σ) 6= 0C . Hence L≤ is controllably
explosive. a
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Next we give some examples of families of paracon-
sistent fuzzy logics that are locally Boolean and some
that are not. In these examples, given an MTL-chain
C, L≤ denotes the degree-preserving companion of the
extension of MTL whose equivalent algebraic semantics
is V(C), i.e. the variety generated by C.
Example 1 Let C be an MTL-chain. Suppose that the
set of its positive and negative elements are respectively
defined as C+ = {a ∈ C | a > ¬a} and C− = {a ∈
C | a ≤ ¬a}. Assume that C+ is an MTL-filter, i.e.
a non-empty upset w.r.t. the order and closed under
&. This means that C+ coincides with the radical of
C (i.e. the intersection of all maximal filters of C; see
e.g. [37]).8 Then C is either bipartite or bipartite with
a fixpoint. In either case, the quotient algebra C/C+
is the two-element Boolean algebra B2, if C has no
negation fixpoint, or the three-element MV-algebra  L3
otherwise. In both cases the logic ofC is locally Boolean
with the formula9 σ(p) = (¬(p2))2. Indeed, it is easy to
see that σC(x) = 1
C
if x ∈ C− and σC(x) = 0C if x ∈
C+. Examples of MTL-chains satisfying this condition
are the Chang MV-algebra, and any WNM-chain (thus
including NM-chains).
Example 2 Let C be the standard MV-chain [0, 1] L.
Then the degree-preserving companion  L≤ of  Lukasiewicz
logic – the logic of C – is not locally Boolean. The re-
sult is obvious because, for every m ≥ 1, any function in
the free m-generated algebra Freem(C) of the variety
MV generated by C, is piecewise linear and continuous
from [0, 1]m into [0, 1] (a McNaughton function [11],
in particular). Hence, the unique Boolean functions of
Freem(C) are f1 (the function constantly equal to 1)
and f0 (the function constantly equal to 0). Therefore,
recalling that ` L ϕ ↔ ¬¬ϕ, if σ is any formula of  L≤
such that, for every C-evaluation v, v(¬σ) ∈ {0C , 1C},
then either fσ = f¬¬σ = f1, and hence ` L≤ ¬¬σ, or
fσ = f0, and hence f¬σ = f1, that is ` L≤ ¬σ.
The following two propositions are more general char-
acterizations of families of paraconsistent fuzzy logics
that are either locally Boolean or not in the setting of
logics of BL-chains. Using the same notation as in the
previous examples we have the following results.
Proposition 7 Let A1 and A2 be MTL-chains, as-
sume that the Monteiro-Baaz operator 4 is definable in
A1 and take C = A1⊕A2. Then L≤ is locally Boolean.
8 This type of chains are studied in [38].
9 Given a natural number n, ϕn is an abbreviation for
ϕ & n. . . & ϕ, that is the fomula obtained as conjunction of
n times ϕ.
Proof: Let δ(p) be the term defining the Monteiro-Baaz
operator 4 in A1, and hence in all chains of the variety
generated by A1, since 4 is well-known to be defined
by a set of equations. Then L≤ is locally Boolean with
σ(p) = ¬δ(p). Indeed, observe that for any evaluation
v on C = A1 ⊕ A2, v(σ(p)) = 1C if v(p) ∈ A1 and
v(σ(p)) = 0
C
otherwise. Finally, the result follows from
the fact that any chain of the variety generated by C is
of the form B1 ⊕B2, where B1 belongs to the variety
generated by A1. a
Remark 1 In the proof of the following proposition, we
will use tools from [1] related to the functional repre-
sentation of free BL-algebras with m generators. Let us
recall some facts from that paper that are needed in the
proposition below. Let C be a BL-chain which can be
displayed as the ordinal sum [0, 1] L⊕A (where A is any
BL-chain). The free m-generated algebra Freem(C) in
the variety V(C) has as elements functions from the
hypercube Cm into C. Each function f ∈ Freem(C)
satisfies the two following properties:
1. The restriction fˆ of f to ([0, 1] L)
m, takes value in
[0, 1] L and it is a McNaughton function. Therefore,
in particular, fˆ is continuous.
2. For any c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Cm \ ([0, 1] L)m, f(c) = 0
iff there exists an x = (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ ([0, 1] L)m such
that:
– there exists at least one coordinate j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that xj = 1,
– ck = xk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} such that xk 6= 1,
– fˆ(x) = 0.
In other words, if for some x in the border of (0, 1]m
(say x = (1, x2, . . . , xm) and xk 6= 1 for all 2 ≤ k ≤
m) we have f(x) = 0, then fˆ(c) = 0 for all c of the
form (c1, x2, . . . , xm) ∈ Cm \ ([0, 1] L)m.
Proposition 8 Let C be a BL-chain such that the logic
L≤ is paraconsistent. Then:
1. If C is defined by an ordinal sum whose first compo-
nent is a finite BL-chain, then L≤ is locally Boolean,
2. if C is defined by an ordinal sum whose first com-
ponent is the  Lukasiewicz t-norm, then L≤ is not
locally Boolean.
Proof: Consider the decomposition of C as ordinal sum
of irreductible BL-chains A1,A2, . . . Since C is not
pseudo-complemented (because L≤ is paraconsistent)
we know that the first component A1 has to be an MV-
algebra. Then, we consider two cases:
(1) A1 is a finite MV-chain. Then the claim follows
by the above Proposition 7 and reminding that in ev-
ery finite MV-chain  Lk, the operator 4 is definable as
4ϕ := ϕk.
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(2) A1 is the standard MV-chain [0, 1] L. We prove that
for L≤ we cannot find any formula σ such that 6`L≤ ¬σ,
6`L≤ ¬¬σ and for every valuation v, v(¬σ) ∈ {0, 1}.
Assume by way of contradiction that such a σ exists
and assume, without loss of generality, that σ has m
propositional variables. Then, in the m-generated free
algebra Freem(C) of V(C), there is a function fσ (cor-
responding to the equivalence class [σ] modulo logical
equivalence) such that fσ : C
m → C, fσ 6= 1, fσ 6= 0,
but fσ is Boolean. Recalling Remark 1, if such an fσ
exists, then the restriction fˆσ of fσ to ([0, 1] L)
m is a Mc-
Naughton function (and hence it is continuous), and we
have three subcases:
1. If fσ restricted to ([0, 1] L)
m is 0, then, in particular,
fσ(x) = 0, for all x = (x1, . . . , xm) for which at
least one index j is such that xj = 1. Then fσ is
also 0 in the second component A2 of the ordinal
sum defining C, i.e. fσ is the map on C
m which is
constantly 0. This contradicts the hypothesis that
6`L≤ ¬σ.
2. If fσ restricted to ([0, 1] L)
m is 1, then for no other el-
ement c ∈ Cm\([0, 1] L)m, fσ(c) = 0 because, in par-
ticular, fˆσ(x) 6= 0, for all (x1, . . . , xm) ∈ ([0, 1] L)m
with xj = 1 for some j. This contradicts the hy-
pothesis that 6`L≤ ¬¬σ.
3. fˆσ is a Boolean function different from the map
which is constantly 1 or 0. This is absurd since fˆσ
is a McNaughton function and hence, as we already
recalled in Example 2, it is continuous.
Hence a contradiction has been reached. a
Corollary 1 Let C be a BL-chain defined by a contin-
uous t-norm and such that the logic L≤ is paraconsis-
tent. Then L≤ is not locally Boolean.
The corollary is an easy consequence of the fact that
any non pseudo-complemented continuous t-norm is de-
composable as an ordinal sum which has the  Lukasiewicz
t-norm as the first component.
Finally, let us consider the notion of gently explosive
logic with respect to a set of formulas ©(p). Recall
Definition 3 and assume that L is a (4-)core fuzzy logic
complete with respect to a class K of L-chains. Then,
thanks to the fact that L≤ is finitary and the presence of
the adjunction rule (Adj−∧), we can assume that©(p)
is just one formula and the definition of L≤ being gently
explosive can be reformulated in semantical terms as
follows:
– (GE-a) there are formulas ϕ,ψ such that:
- there is a chain A ∈ K and an A-evaluation e1
such that e1(©(ϕ) ∧ ϕ) > e1(ψ),
- there is a chain B ∈ K and an B-evaluation e2
such that e2(©(ϕ) ∧ ¬ϕ) > e2(ψ),
– (GE-b) for every formula ϕ, every chain A ∈ K and
every A-evaluation e, e(©(ϕ) ∧ ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ) = 0A.
In the case L is complete with respect to a single
L-chain A, these conditions imply that the unary oper-
ation ©A (the interpretation of © on the algebra A)
has to satisfy the properties given in the next proposi-
tion.
Proposition 9 Let L be the logic of a chain A. Then
the following are equivalent:
1. L≤ is gently explosive;
2. There exists a term ©(p) such that
- ©A(0A) > 0A,
- there is an x ∈ A with ¬x = 0A and©A(x) > 0A,
- ©A(t) = 0A, for each t ∈ A such that t,¬t > 0A.
Proof: In the proof we use© for both the term and its
corresponding operation on the chain A as the context
will avoid any possible confusion. Assume that L≤ is
gently explosive. Then there exists a formula©(p) sat-
isfying the reformulation mentioned above. Thus there
are x, y ∈ A, such that x∧©(x) > 0A and©(y)∧¬y >
0
A
,10 and for every z ∈ A, z ∧ ¬z ∧ ©(z) = 0A. It is
clear that the latter equality for every z ∈ A implies the
last condition from 2. From the properties of x and y
it follows that x,¬y > 0A, ¬x = 0A, and y = 0A, and
hence ©(0A) > 0A, so the remaining two conditions
are satisfied.
Reciprocally, if 2 is satisfied, let x ∈ A be such that
¬x = 0A and ©(x) > 0A, that exists by hypothesis.
Obviously, such an x has to be greater than 0
A
. Now
take ϕ = p and ψ = 0, where p is a propositional vari-
able and let e1 be an A-evaluation such that e1(p) = x.
It is clear that e1(©(ϕ)∧ϕ) = min{©A(x), x} > 0A =
e1(ψ). Now let e2 be an A-evaluation such that e2(p) =
0
A
. Then, since by hypothesis ©A(0A) > 0A, it is also
clear that e2(©(ϕ)∧¬ϕ) = min{©A(0A), 1A} > 0A =
e2(ψ). Thus the proposition is proved. a
We have, therefore, identified the conditions for the
degree-preserving fuzzy logic of an (expansion of an)
MTL-chain to be gently explosive. The following ex-
amples show that the degree-preserving version of the
[0, 1]-valued  Lukasiewicz logic is not gently explosive,
while finitely-valued  Lukasiewicz logics are gently ex-
plosive.
Example 3 The logic  L≤, i.e. the degree-preserving com-
panion of  Lukasiewicz logic, is not gently explosive. In
fact, as we recalled in Example 2, every definable term
10 Note that x and y correspond respectively to e1(ϕ) and
e2(ϕ).
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of such logic corresponds to a McNaughton function
[11], and McNaughton functions, being continuous, can-
not satisfy the conditions of the previous proposition.
Example 4 If L has the Monteiro-Baaz’s 4 connective
(as primitive or definable), then L≤ is gently explosive
with ©(α) = 4(α ∨ ¬α), as one can easily check using
the conditions of the previous proposition. This is the
case of the logic of a finite MV-chain  Ln (where 4ϕ =
ϕn) or, more in general, the logic of an SnMTL-chain
11
(where 4ϕ = ¬ϕn ∨ ϕ) [29].
As an immediate corollary of the preceding propo-
sition, we have the following characterization of when
a degree-preserving fuzzy logic of an (expansion of an)
MTL-chain is an LFI with respect to the residual nega-
tion ¬.
Corollary 2 Let L be the logic of a chain A that is
not an SMTL-algebra, i.e. such that there exists x ∈ A
with x ∧ ¬x > 0A. Then the following are equivalent:
1. L≤ is an LFI with respect to ¬;
2. There exists a term ©(p) such that
- ©A(0A) > 0A,
- there is an x ∈ A with ¬x = 0A and©A(x) > 0A,
- ©A(t) = 0A, for each t ∈ A such that t,¬t > 0A.
4 Paraconsistency of fuzzy logics expanded
with further negations
In this section we consider fuzzy logics expanded with
negations different from the residuated one and explore
their paraconsistency properties with respect to these
new negations. To remain in the realm of fuzzy logics,
whose algebraic semantics are given by classes of lin-
early ordered algebras, we only consider expansions of
fuzzy logics with negations defined in such a way that
semilinearity is preserved, i.e. they remain core fuzzy
logics. In such a case, since the negation on a chain A
is a generalization of classical negation, the truth func-
tion neg of any such negation neg satisfies neg(0
A
) =
1
A
and neg(1
A
) = 0
A
. Therefore, although a (truth-
preserving) fuzzy logic L expanded with a negation neg
will also not be paraconsistent, its degree preserving
companion will be paraconsistent provided that ϕ ∧
neg(ϕ) is not equivalent to 0¯ (as in the case of a non
pseudo-complemented residuated negation).
The next two subsections are devoted to the study
of expansions of a core fuzzy logic L and of its degree
preserving companion L≤ obtained by adding either the
11 An SnMTL-chain A is a MTL-chain satisfying the equa-
tion x ∨ ¬xn−1 = 1A.
dual intuitionistic negation D, or an involutive negation
∼. In the last case, the expansion has sense only if the
residuated negation of L is not already involutive. In
what follows we will denote by LD and L
≤
D, and by L∼
and L≤∼, the expansions of L and L
≤ with D and ∼
respectively.
4.1 Adding the dual intuitionistic negation
In his 1919 paper [46], Skolem studied lattices expanded
with the relative pseudo-complement and its dual. This
dual operation, which he called Subtraktion and for
which we use the notation –˙, satisfies the following con-
dition:
a –˙ b ≤ c iff a ≤ b ∨ c .
He noted that it follows the existence of both top 1
and bottom. He also briefly considered the associated
negation 1 –˙ b of b, for which we will use the notation
Db. It follows that Db ≤ c iff b ∨ c = 1.
Afterwards, in his 1942 paper [36] and independently
of [46], Moisil provided an axiomatization of the expan-
sion of positive intuitionistic logic with the dual of the
intuitionistic conditional. In particular, in the case of
the dual of intuitionistic negation, for which we use
again D, he obtained the following derivable formula
and rule:
(D1) ϕ ∨Dϕ ,
(DR) from ϕ ∨ ψ derive Dϕ→ ψ .
Note that the given axiom and rule define D univo-
cally, in the sense that, duplicating (D1) and (DR) for
a connective D′, it follows that D′ϕ and Dϕ are inter-
derivable.
Later on, in her 1974 paper [45] and independently
of [46] and [36], Rauszer presented a logico-algebraic
study of what she called semi-Boolean algebras. These
are expansions of Heyting algebras with the mentioned
dual operator –˙ already used by Skolem. She also pro-
vided an axiomatization that, though being different,
has the same consequences as the one by Moisil.
More recently, Priest [41] provided a natural deduc-
tion version of the logic we are considering. However,
in the case of D, instead of using a rule equivalent to
(DR), he used a rule that in the context of a Hilbert
style axiomatization can be given as follows:
(DR-r) If ` ϕ ∨ ψ, then from ϕ ∨ ψ derive Dϕ→ ψ .
Honoring da Costa, he called his logic da Costa Logic
and used the notation daC.
Further investigations have been provided by Cas-
tiglioni and Ertola in [10], where they proved that daC
is boldly paraconsistent, and by Ferguson in [24], where
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he proved that daC is an LFI. The operator D had also
been discussed by Ertola in [20].
In this section we study D-paraconsistency proper-
ties in the setting of (semilinear) fuzzy logics. First of
all, we need to specify the behaviour of this D oper-
ator. We start from the Hilbert style axiomatization
of D consisting of any axiomatization of intuitionistic
positive logic (for example, as given in [10]) with modus
ponens as only rule, and add (D1) as axiom and (DR)
as a new rule. Honoring Moisil, let us call this logic M.
Intuitively, given any core fuzzy logic L, if we want
the axiom (D1) to be always evaluated to 1
A
in any
expanded L-chain A with an operator D, it has to sat-
isfy Dx = 1
A
, for every x ∈ A such that x < 1A, while
the validity of the rule (DR) implies that D(1
A
) = 0
A
.
Therefore the axiom and rule of M totally determine
the algebraic counterpart of the D operator on chains,
but not on arbitrary algebras. Since we aim at defining
a semilinear logic, this is not a problem. Indeed, the
semilinearity of the expanded logic can be enforced in
different ways. One possibility, as will be shown later, is
to replace the rule (DR) by a somewhat stronger rule,
leading us to the following definition.
Definition 5 For each core fuzzy logic L, the logic LD
is defined by expanding the language of L with the
unary connective D and adding the following axiom
and rule:
(D1) ϕ ∨Dϕ
(DN) from ϕ ∨ ψ derive ¬Dϕ ∨ ψ .
It can be easily checked that, in contrast to the logic
M, LD proves the theorem Dϕ∨¬Dϕ, forcing formulas
of the form Dϕ to be classical. Moreover, as expected,
one has that ϕ,Dϕ `LD 0, and hence LD is explosive
with respect to D. Note that the latter is also true in
the case of M.
Next we show that LD satisfies the congruence prop-
erty (Cng) for D, which is true also in the case of M.
Lemma 1 If L is a core fuzzy logic, in LD the follow-
ing deduction holds:
ϕ→ ψ `LD Dψ → Dϕ.
Proof: From ϕ → ψ and ϕ ∨Dϕ one can easily derive
ψ ∨ Dϕ, and using (DN) one obtains ¬Dψ ∨ Dϕ, and
hence, Dψ → Dϕ holds as well. a
Therefore, the congruence condition (Cng) holds for
D and thus LD is a Rasiowa-implicative logic. Since the
rule (DN) is closed under ∨-forms, it follows that LD is
semilinear as well.
The corresponding algebraic semantics for the logic
LD is given by the class of LD-algebras. Those are struc-
tures 〈A,∧,∨,&,→, D, 0A, 1A〉, where D is a unary op-
eration, such that their D-free reduct is an L-algebra
and the two following properties hold for each x, y ∈ A:
– x ∨Dx = 1A ,
– if x ∨ y = 1A, then ¬Dx ∨ y = 1A .
From this definition, it is clear that the class of LD-
algebras is a quasivariety. We shall show shortly that
the class of LD-algebras is indeed a variety. Since LD
is semilinear, it is complete with respect to the class
of LD-chains. Moreover, it is easy to check that if L is
standard complete, then so is LD. Furthermore, let us
remark that, as already announced, in any LD-chain,
the two conditions above univocally determine the D
operator to be defined in the following manner:
Dx =
{
1
A
, if x < 1
A
,
0
A
, if x = 1
A
.
It follows that D is indeed the dual intuitionistic nega-
tion (it satisfies Dx = min{y | x ∨ y = 1A}).
Regarding the interaction between the two nega-
tions ¬ and D, it is clear that in any LD-chain we have
the following negative combinations:
¬D¬x ≤ ¬x ≤ D¬¬x ≤ Dx.
Note that ¬D¬ is in fact the intuitionistic (Go¨del) nega-
tion, and hence the smallest (strongest) negation defin-
able in a chain, while D is the greatest (weakest) defin-
able negation in a chain. On the other hand, we have
the following positive combinations:
¬Dx ≤ x ≤ ¬¬x ≤ D¬x,
also having that ¬Dx ≤ DD¬¬x ≤ ¬¬x, with DD¬¬x
being not comparable with x. Note that if ¬ is Go¨del
negation, then DD¬¬x = ¬¬x = D¬x.
It is also straightforward to observe that on every
LD-chain, D behaves exactly as the residual negation
composed with the Monteiro-Baaz operator 4. Actu-
ally, one can check that the logic LD is equivalent to
L4, since in L4 the connective D is definable as
Dϕ := ¬4ϕ
and, vice versa, in LD the connective 4 is indeed de-
finable as
4ϕ := ¬Dϕ.
Thus, LD is equivalent to L4 and therefore LD-algebras
are termwise equivalent to L4, whence they form a va-
riety.
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Concerning paraconsistency properties related to D,
as already noticed above, for any core fuzzy logic L,
the logic LD is not D-paraconsistent. Therefore, let us
turn our attention to their degree-preserving compan-
ions L≤D. As usual, the logic L
≤
D is defined from L
≤ by
adding the axiom (D1) and the following restriction of
the rule (DN):
(DN-r) If `LD ϕ∨ψ, then from ϕ∨ψ derive ¬Dϕ∨ψ .
These logics are D-paraconsistent.
Proposition 10 For any core fuzzy logic L, the logic
L≤D is D-paraconsistent.
Proof: It is clear that, in any LD-chain A, x∧Dx > 0A
for 0
A
< x < 1
A
. Hence, it is clear that, if p and q are
two different propositional variables, then p,Dp 6`
L
≤
D
q.
Therefore, the logic L≤D is D-paraconsistent. a
Moreover, we can show that every logic L≤D is gently
D-paraconsistent and, in some cases, even boldly para-
consistent. Namely, bold paraconsistency is obtained
provided that LD is complete with respect to chains
without coatom (the coatom of a chain A is the ele-
ment max(A \ {1A}), which need not exist); such re-
quirement is met by many fuzzy logics, e.g. by logics
complete w.r.t. densely ordered chains (in particular,
logics satisfying standard completeness).
Proposition 11 L≤D is boldly D-paraconsistent if LD
is complete with respect to chains without coatom.
Proof: Suppose now that ψ(p1, . . . , pn) is a formula such
that 0LD ψ. By assumption, there exists an evaluation v
on an LD-chainA without coatom such that v(ψ) < 1
A
.
In order to prove that L≤D is boldly D-paraconsistent it
is enough to show that there exists a formula ϕ such
that ϕ,Dϕ 6`
L
≤
D
ψ. Let hence ϕ be a variable q not
occurring in ψ. Then, define an A-evaluation v′ such
that v′(pi) = v(pi) for each i = 1, . . . , n and v′(q) = β,
where β ∈ A is such that 1A > β > v′(ψ) = v(ψ).
Observe that the fact that A has no coatom guaran-
tees the existence of such a β. Then, we clearly have
v′(q ∧ Dq) = v′(q) > v′(ψ), and hence p,Dp 6`
L
≤
D
ψ,
that is to say, the logic L≤D is not partially explosive
with respect to any σ. a
We leave as an open problem whether the condi-
tion of being complete with respect to chains without
coatom is also necessary. All we can say is that there are
logics L≤D that are not boldly paraconsistent with LD
being complete with respect to chains with a coatom.
Namely, for instance if L is the three-valued Go¨del or
 Lukasiewicz logic, it is easy to check that L≤D is partially
D-explosive with respect to σ(p) = p ∨ ¬p. Indeed we
have that ϕ,Dϕ `
L
≤
D
ψ ∨ ¬ψ, for all ϕ and ψ.
Proposition 12 For any core fuzzy logic L, the logic
L≤D is gently D-paraconsistent, and hence it is a D-LFI.
Proof: In order to prove that the logic is gently D-
paraconsistent, consider
©(p) = 4(p ∨ ¬p) = ¬D(p ∨ ¬p).
An easy computation shows that the formula©(p) sat-
isfies the required conditions. In fact, it is obvious that
over any chain C of the variety, we have:
(1) there is an evaluation e such that e(©(p)∧ p) = 1C
(take e(p) = 1
C
);
(2) there is an evaluation v such that v(©(p) ∧Dp) =
1
C
(take e(p) = 0
C
); and
(3) for each evaluation e, e(©(ϕ) ∧ ϕ ∧ Dϕ) = 0C .
Indeed, take into account that if e(ϕ) ∈ {0C , 1C}
the result is obvious, and if 0
C
< e(ϕ) < 1
C
, then
e(©(p)) = e(4(p ∨ ¬p)) = 0C).
Therefore, conditions (GE-a) and (GE-b) are satisfied.
Thus, L≤D is gently D-paraconsistent, and thus is an
LFI as well. a
Notice that the argument involving Kleene axiom we
used in Proposition 5 to show that a degree-preserving
fuzzy logic L≤ is partially explosive (and hence not
boldly paraconsistent), cannot be applied when the con-
sidered negation is the dual intuitionistic negation D.
In fact, although Kleene axiom (ϕ ∧Dϕ) → (ψ ∨Dψ)
trivially holds, the argument used above cannot be ap-
plied in this framework since the formula ψ ∨Dψ is a
theorem of L≤D. On the other hand, the condition that
the logic is complete with respect to chains without
coatom cannot be removed, since there are examples of
L≤D that are partially explosive. Take for instance the
degree-preserving companion  L≤n of the logic  Ln which
is complete with respect to evaluations over the finite
chain  Ln (the  Lukasiewicz chain of n+ 1 elements) and
consider a formula ψ = σ(p1, . . . , pk) such that for any
evaluation e, e(ψ) ≥ rn, where rn is the coatom of  Ln.
Therefore, in the logic  L≤n,D, it holds that, for each for-
mula ϕ and each evaluation e, e(ϕ∧Dϕ) ≤ rn and thus
ϕ,Dϕ `
L
≤
n,D
ψ, i.e. the logic is partially explosive.
4.2 Adding an involutive negation
Another kind of negations very relevant in fuzzy log-
ics are involutive negations. There is a whole class of
extensions of MTL whose residual negation is not in-
volutive (all those logics that are not IMTL), among
them Go¨del and Product logic. Therefore for all these
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logics it makes sense to consider expansions with a new
involutive negation.
As far as we know, expansions of fuzzy logics with
an involutive negation have only been studied in the
literature together with the Monteiro-Baaz 4 operator
[22,13,23]. Here we define an expansion of a core fuzzy
logic L by an involutive negation without using 4.12
We hence define the logic L∼ as the expansion of L by
a new unary connective ∼ with the following additional
axiom and rule:
(∼) ∼∼ϕ↔ ϕ,
(OR) from (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ χ derive (∼ψ → ∼ϕ) ∨ χ .
Note that, using (∼) and (OR), one can show that
∼1 ↔ 0 and ∼0 ↔ 1. Also notice that rule (OR) im-
plies that the congruence condition (Cng) holds for ∼
and thus L∼ is a Rasiowa-implicative logic. Moreover,
the rule (OR) is closed under ∨-forms, implying that
L∼ is semilinear as well (see [14]).
An L∼-algebra is a structure 〈A,∧,∨,&,→,∼, 0A, 1A〉
such that the ∼-free reduct is an L-algebra and the two
following properties hold for each x, y, z ∈ A:
– ∼∼x = x,
– if (x→ y) ∨ z = 1A, then (∼y → ∼x) ∨ z = 1A .
As for the interaction between the residual negation
¬ and the involutive negation ∼, let us remark that
they are incomparable in general. However, when ¬ is
Go¨del negation, then for any x ∈ A we clearly have the
following negative combinations
¬x ≤ ∼x ≤ ¬¬∼x.
Note that ¬¬∼ = D. As for the positive combinations
we have:
¬∼x ≤ x = ∼∼x ≤ ¬¬x = ∼¬x.
Given the axiomatization of L∼, we can easily obtain
an axiomatization of L≤∼ just by replacing the (OR) rule
by its restriction to theorems:
(OR-r) if `L∼ (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ χ,
from (ϕ→ ψ) ∨ χ derive (∼ψ → ∼ϕ) ∨ χ .
Now we turn our attention to paraconsistency with
respect to ∼.
Proposition 13 L∼ is not ∼-paraconsistent, but L≤∼
is always ∼-paraconsistent.
12 Of course, the interesting case is when the negation ¬ of
L is not involutive.
Proof: Observe that there is no evaluation e such that
e(ϕ) = e(∼ϕ) = 1, and hence, for all formulas ϕ and
ψ, we have {ϕ,∼ϕ} `L∼ ψ, and thus L∼ is ∼-explosive.
Moreover, the same argument used in the proof of Propo-
sition 4 easily shows that L≤∼ is ∼-paraconsistent. No-
tice that the logic L≤∼ is ∼-paraconsistent for any ax-
iomatic extension L of MTL, and not only for non
pseudo-complemented extensions, because ∼ is involu-
tive. Indeed, if A is an L∼-chain with more than two
elements, one can always find an A-evaluation e such
that e(p ∧ ∼p) > 0A. a
Proposition 14 The logic L≤∼ is not ∼-boldly paracon-
sistent. Indeed, it is partially ∼-explosive with respect to
σ(p) = p ∨ ∼p.
Proof: It is obvious that Kleene’s axiom is also valid
for the negation ∼, and, if ϕ is not a theorem of L∼,
then ϕ ∨ ∼ϕ is not a theorem as well. Then the proof
of Proposition 5 is also valid and therefore the logic L≤∼
is partially ∼-explosive. a
Finally, whether L≤∼ is gently∼-explosive (and hence
a ∼-LFI) depends on the initial logic L. For example,
if 4 is a definable connective13 in L∼, then it is imme-
diate that L≤∼ is gently ∼-explosive. Indeed, consider
©(ϕ) = 4(ϕ∨¬ϕ) and an obvious computation proves
that the operator © satisfies the required conditions.
Observe that in the logics where 4 is definable, the
dual intuitionistic negation is also definable (remember
that Dϕ ↔ ¬4ϕ) and therefore, in this setting, both
D and ∼ appear together.
Remark 2 In this subsection we have discussed the para-
consistent properties of degree-preserving fuzzy logics
when expanded by an involutive negation. In particu-
lar, it is worth noticing that Proposition 13 also ap-
plies to the ∼-expansions of those logics which, with
respect to their residual negation ¬, are explosive. This
is the case, for instance, of the degree-preserving com-
panion of any pseudo-complemented expansion of MTL
(i.e. expansion of SMTL). Nevertheless, there are other
techniques which can be used to introduce an involu-
tive variant of these logics –and hence a paraconsis-
tent degree-preserving companion of these logics– which
uses the so called connected and disconnected rotation
constructions [32]. As shown in [39,37], in fact, for each
SMTL-chainA, its connected rotation is a perfect IMTL-
chain with negation fixpoint (cf. [37, Theorem 6.40]),
while the disconnected rotation of A is an IMTL-chain
without fixpoint [39, Theorem 2].
13 As it occurs either in any pseudo-complemented logic
where 4 is definable as 4ϕ := ¬∼ϕ or in a finitely-valued
 Lukasiewicz logic  Lnwhere 4 is definable as 4ϕ := ϕn.
Paraconsistency properties in degree-preserving fuzzy logics 13
5 First-order degree-preserving fuzzy logics
In this final section we will consider first-order fuzzy
logics with paraconsistency properties. First we need
to recall the usual presentation of first-order formalisms
for fuzzy logics.14
Let us fix a finitary semilinear expansion of a core
fuzzy logic L satisfying (Cng) in order to define its
truth-preserving first-order extension L∀. The predi-
cate language P of L∀ is built in the standard clas-
sical way with a set of predicate symbols Pred, a set of
function symbols Funct, and a set of object variables
V ar, together with the quantifiers ∀ and ∃. The set of
terms Term is the minimum set containing the elements
of V ar and closed under the functions. Atomic for-
mulas are expressions of the form P (t1, . . . , tn), where
P ∈ Pred and t1, . . . , tn ∈ Term. The set of all for-
mulas is obtained by closing the set of atomic formu-
las under combination by propositional connectives and
quantification, i.e. if ϕ is a formula and x is an object
variable, then (∀x)ϕ and (∃x)ϕ are formulas as well.
In first-order fuzzy logics the semantics is based
on chains only. Given an L-chain A, an A-structure
is M = 〈M, 〈PM〉P∈Pred, 〈fM〉f∈Funct〉 where M 6= ∅,
fM : M
ar(f) → M , and PM : Mar(P ) → A for each
f ∈ Funct and P ∈ Pred (where ar is the function
that gives the arity of function and predicate symbols).
For each M-evaluation of variables v : V ar → M , the
interpretation of a t ∈ Term, denoted tM,v, is defined
as in classical first-order logic. The truth-value ‖ϕ‖AM,v
of a formula is defined inductively from
‖P (t1, . . . , tn)‖AM,v = PM(t1M,v, . . . , tnM,v),
taking into account that the value commutes with con-
nectives, and defining
‖(∀x)ϕ‖AM,v = inf{‖ϕ‖AM,v′ | v(y) = v′(y) for all
variables y, except x}
‖(∃x)ϕ‖AM,v = sup{‖ϕ‖AM,v′ | v(y) = v′(y) for all
variables y, except x}
if the infimum and supremum exist in A, otherwise the
truth-value(s) remain undefined. An A-structure M is
called safe if all infima and suprema needed for the
definition of the truth-value of any formula exist in A.
The axioms for L∀ are obtained from those of L by
substitution of propositional variables with first-order
formulas plus the following axioms for quantifiers:
(∀1) (∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x))
(∃1) ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x) (t substitutable for x in ϕ(x))
(∀2) (∀x)(ν → ϕ)→ (ν → (∀x)ϕ) (x not free in ν)
(∃2) (∀x)(ϕ→ ν)→ ((∃x)ϕ→ ν) (x not free in ν)
(∀3) (∀x)(ϕ ∨ ν)→ ((∀x)ϕ ∨ ν) (x not free in ν)
14 For more details and proofs see e.g [12].
The rules of inference of L∀ are the rules of L (again
by substituting propositional variables with first-order
formulas) plus generalization: from ϕ infer (∀x)ϕ. Note
that modus ponens is already in L.
This axiomatic system captures the intended truth-
preserving semantical consequence in the following way:
for any set of formulas T and each formula ϕ, we have
that T `L∀ ϕ iff for each L-chain A and each safe A-
structure, if ‖ψ‖AM,v = 1
A
for each ψ ∈ T and each
M-evaluation v, then also ‖ϕ‖AM,v = 1
A
for each M-
evaluation v.
Degree-preserving first-order fuzzy logics have not
been considered in the literature yet. However, it is not
difficult to extend the definitions from [6] to first-order
logics.
Definition 6 Given a first-order fuzzy logic L∀, its
degree-preserving companion is denoted as L∀≤ and it
is semantically defined in the following way: for every
set of predicate formulas Γ ∪ {ϕ}, Γ `L∀≤ ϕ iff there
is a finite Γ0 ⊆ Γ such that for every L-chain A, every
a ∈ A, every A-structure M and every M-evaluation
v, if a ≤ ‖ψ‖AM,v for every ψ ∈ Γ0 , then a ≤ ‖ϕ‖AM,v.
The relations between the truth-preserving logic and
its degree-preserving companion are analogous to those
described in the propositional case:
Proposition 15 The following facts hold:
(1) The two logics L∀ and L∀≤ have the same tautolo-
gies.
(2) For all formulas ϕ,ψ one has: ϕ,ψ `L∀≤ ϕ ∧ ψ.
(3) ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `L∀≤ ψ iff `L∀ (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)→ ψ.
Proof All the claims are straightforward; let us prove
the last one as an example. Assume first that we have
ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `L∀≤ ψ. Let A be an L-chain, M an A-
structure, and v an M-evaluation. For each a ∈ A, we
know that if a ≤ ‖ϕi‖AM,v for each i, then a ≤ ‖ψ‖AM,v.
So, taking a = min{‖ϕ1‖AM,v, . . . , ‖ϕn‖AM,v}, we obtain
that a = ‖ϕ1∧. . .∧ϕn‖AM,v ≤ ‖ψ‖AM,v, hence ‖(ϕ1∧. . .∧
ϕn) → ψ‖AM,v = 1
A
, and so `L∀ (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) → ψ.
Conversely, assume that `L∀ (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) → ψ and
take an L-chainA, anA-structure M, an M-evaluation
v, and a ∈ A such that a ≤ ‖ϕi‖AM,v for each i. Then,
since ‖(ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn) → ψ‖AM,v = 1
A
, we have that
‖ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn‖AM,v ≤ ‖ψi‖AM,v, and hence a ≤ ‖ψ‖AM,v.
Moreover, it is quite straightforward to obtain a
Hilbert-style presentation for L∀≤:
Proposition 16 The logic L∀≤ can be presented by a
Hilbert-style proof system with the same axioms as L∀
and the following inference rules:
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(Adj-∧) from ϕ and ψ derive ϕ ∧ ψ,
(MP-r) if `L∀ ϕ→ ψ, then from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ derive
ψ,
(gen-r) if `L∀ ϕ, then from ϕ derive (∀x)ϕ,
(R-r) if (R) is a rule of L∀ (obtained from a proposi-
tional rule of L different from modus ponens) whose
premises are theorems of L∀, then from the premises
one can derive the conclusion.
Proof: Let us denote the provability relation induced
by the Hilbert-style system as `S. We have to show
that for every set of formulas T ∪ {ϕ}, it holds that
T `S ϕ iff T `L∀≤ ϕ. Soundness is obvious. Suppose
that T `L∀≤ ϕ. We can assume that T is finite, say
T = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕk}. We obtain `L∀
∧k
i=1 ϕi → ϕ. Let
〈ψ1, . . . , ψn−1,
∧k
i=1 ϕi → ϕ〉 be a proof of
∧k
i=1 ϕi → ϕ
in `L∀. Then 〈ψ1, . . . , ψn−1,
∧k
i=1 ϕi → ϕ,ϕ1, . . . , ϕk,∧k
i=1 ϕi, ϕ〉 is indeed a proof in `S of ϕ from T , using:
(i) (MP-r), (gen-r) and (R-r) instead of each applica-
tion of modus ponens, generalization and rules (R)
in the original proof, and
(ii) (Adj-∧) and (MP-r) in the last two steps.
a
The notions of paraconsistency considered in this
paper are essentially propositional because they refer to
the behaviour of a negation connective and their char-
acterizations refer to propositional conditions (pseudo-
complementation, existence of certain propositional for-
mulas σ(p) or ©(p)). Therefore, regarding their para-
consistency, we can obtain for first-order fuzzy logics
the same results as for the propositional ones; to sum
it up:
– Truth-preserving logics L∀ are explosive with re-
spect to ¬.
– L∀≤ is paraconsistent iff L is not pseudo-complemented.
– L∀≤ is partially explosive with respect to σ(p) =
p ∨ ¬p.
– L∀≤ is controllably explosive iff it is locally Boolean.
– The notion of gently explosive and its characteriza-
tion in Proposition 9.
– LD∀ is D-explosive, but LD∀≤ is D-paraconsistent.
– LD∀≤ is gently D-paraconsistent, and so, an LFI.
– LD∀≤ is boldly paraconsistent if it is complete with
respect to models over chains without coatom.
– L∼∀≤ is ∼-paraconsistent.
– L∼∀≤ is partially ∼-explosive with respect to σ(p) =
p ∨ ∼p.
6 Final remarks
In this paper we have been concerned with exploring
paraconsistency properties of different kinds of formal
systems of fuzzy logic. It has been shown that, while
truth-preserving fuzzy logics are not paraconsistent, a
class of degree-preserving fuzzy logics are indeed para-
consistent, and some of them can be even considered
as proper LFIs, so the fuzzy logic paradigm provides
brand new examples of well-behaved paraconsistent log-
ics. In this final section we want to briefly comment on
their distinctive features and similarities with respect
to other paraconsistent systems.
– Our paraconsistent fuzzy logics satisfy the adjunc-
tion rule (Adj-∧), i.e. from ϕ and ψ one can derive
ϕ ∧ ψ. This is not the case in other paraconsistent
logics such as Jas´kowski’s discussive logic [31] (de-
fined as a modification of the modal logic S5: Γ `J ϕ
iff Γ `S5 ϕ). It is clear that p,¬p 0J q, while
p ∧ ¬p `J q. In L≤ logics, both derivations fail, i.e.
p,¬p 0L≤ q and p ∧ ¬p 0L≤ q, which shows a more
robust non-explosive character.
– Unlike paraconsistent systems obtained by requiring
only some conditions on classical evaluations (like
da Costa’s C1 and Cω [17] or De Batens’ PI [4]),
L≤ logics are completely truth-functional, i.e. the
value of any complex formula can be computed from
the truth value of its atomic parts. Moreover, we
do not consider only evaluations over the classical
truth values {0, 1}, but also over MTL-chains and
their expansions.
– L≤ logics are genuine many-valued logics, directly
introduced in terms of consequence relation with re-
spect to an intended algebraic semantics. In this as-
pect, they are similar to other paraconsistent logics
such as Priest’s logic of paradox LP [40] which has
also been defended as “a candidate for a paraconsis-
tent fuzzy logic” (see e.g. [42]). LP is a three-valued
logic with truth values 0, 1 a third value b for both
true and false; the connectives ∧,∨,¬ are defined as
in the three-valued Kleene logic and the set of desig-
nated values is {b, 1}, instead of just {1} as in Kleene
logic. The tautologies of LP coincide with those of
classical logic. One could define analogous systems
over richer sets of truth values, even the continuous
interval, but they would still be equivalent to LP.
We argue that L≤ logics are more suitable as para-
consistent fuzzy logics, since they do not validate all
classical tautologies.
A more interesting many-valued paraconsistent logic
is Pac, obtained as the conservative expansion of LP
with classical implication. Pac is boldly paraconsis-
tent, but not controllably explosive and not an LFI;
however it can be expanded to the system J3 (also
known as LFI1) which is boldly paraconsistent and
an LFI (see [8] and references thereof for more in-
formation about these systems). Again, regardless
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of their interest as very expressive paraconsistent
logics, the fact that these many-valued logics prove
the excluded middle law sets them apart from the
fuzzy logic paradigm we have followed here.
– The degree-preserving algebraic semantics we have
proposed was not alien to the paraconsistent world.
For instance, Dunn’s system FDE [18] can be pre-
sented (see e.g. [42]) as the degree-preserving conse-
quence relation given by the four-element De Mor-
gan algebra. If a and b are the two non-classical
elements of the algebra, the paraconsistency of the
logic follows from the fact that a ∧ ¬a = a ∧ a =
a 6≤ b. Another interesting example is Goodman’s
logic [27] defined as degree-preserving consequence
on dual Heyting algebras; it has the same tautolo-
gies as classical logic. Also, as already mentioned in
Section 3, Priest already noticed in [43] that the
degree-preserving  Lukasiewicz logic  L≤ was para-
consistent.
– All degree-preserving fuzzy logics studied in this pa-
per satisfy the weakening law (i.e. they prove the
theorem ϕ → (ψ → ϕ), or equivalently in their al-
gebraic semantics, the neutral element 1 is the max-
imum element in the lattice order), because they are
based on (4-)core fuzzy logics that already satisfy
this law. Moreover, with the exception of Go¨del-
Dummett logic (for which G = G≤), they do not
satisfy the contraction law (ϕ → ϕ & ϕ or, alge-
braically, idempotence of &). This separates our ap-
proach from studies of paraconsistency in the frame-
work of relevant logics, that cannot satisfy weaken-
ing (whereas many of them satisfy contraction). An
interesting topic for further research would be to
consider a systematic study of weakening-free semi-
linear substructural logics which, even in the truth-
preserving paradigm, would display a paraconsistent
behavior. This should take into account, as a promi-
nent example, the relevance logic with mingle RM
(see e.g. [19]).
– Many paraconsistent logics, such as da Costa’s log-
ics Cn (1 ≤ n < ω) can be axiomatized as expan-
sions of classical positive logic. This is not the case
for L≤, which, already in the fragment without ¬
and 0 have a strictly subclassical behavior.
– A usual matter of concern in paraconsistent systems
is whether they can have a material implication like
classical logic (see e.g. [42]). Our approach does not
consider material implication. Instead of that we are
based on a residuated implication→ which plays an
essential roˆle from the very notion of semilinearity.
Indeed, the algebraic semantincs of our logics is or-
dered by→ (i.e. in every algebraA, for each a, b ∈ A
a ≤ b iff a →A b = 1A) and this order relation de-
termines the chains with respect to which the logic
is required to be complete.
As regards decidability and complexity issues, it is
worth mentioning that our proposed logics have a nice
behaviour or, at least, no worse than that of their truth-
preserving counterparts. Indeed, the theorems of L and
L≤ coincide, and for most well known fuzzy logics this
set is decidable and even coNP-complete (see e.g. [28]).
As for derivations, just recall that ϕ1, . . . , ϕn `L≤ ψ iff
`L (ϕ1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕn)→ ψ.
An important issue for the study of degree-preserving
fuzzy logics as LFIs is that of understanding their con-
sistency operators from an algebraic semantical point
of view. This is the topic of the recent work [15], which
follows the proposal of the present paper.
As a last remark, we would like to point out that
the kind of inconsistencies that our paraconsistent fuzzy
logics can deal with only arise from the very reason of
dealing with intermediate degrees of truth, that is, all
these systems immediately become explosive as soon
as one forces propositions to be two-valued. Practical
inconsistency handling mechanisms using these para-
consistent fuzzy logics remain to be explored.
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